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Risk society is a catastrophic society.
In it, the exceptional condition threatens to become the norm.
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society (1986)
After the catastrophe of the great depression in the 
early 1930s, intense political efforts were undertaken 
to ensure that such a calamity (and its political conse-
quences) won’t ever set the world on fire again. Inde-
ed, after the Second World War, the economic system 
of the Western world experienced a lengthy period of 
basic economic stability and security, which led some 
authors to speak of the post-war era as a “golden age 
of capitalism” (Marglin/Schor 1992). Most importantly, 
for ordinary people, the economic world had become 
not only a more prosperous, but also a safer, more se-
cure and trustworthy place.
Despite temporarily rising inflation and gradually 
increasing unemployment rates in some countries 
since the mid 1970s, most people’s sense in Western 
countries’ middle classes still was a feeling of basic 
economic security. In contrast to the situation in 
many developing countries, the mind of the Western 
middle classes was shaped by the (unconscious) con-
viction that – in general – you can rely on the institu-
tions of the market economy, the trustworthiness of 
its major players, the honesty of its regulators, the 
absence of blatant economic injustice, the appropriate 
legal punishment of outright economic fraud and ir-
responsibility, and so on. Seldom and rather limited 
incidents which contradicted these expectations were 
rather taken as exceptions which proved the rule.
A similar sense of basic confidence was also charac-
teristic for the economics profession. In the eyes of 
leading economists, the economic glitch of the 1970s 
was followed by a period called “the great moderation” 
(a substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility), 
as Ben Bernanke (2004), now chairman of the US Fed-
eral Reserve, entitled his speech before the American 
Eastern Economic Association. Just one year earlier, 
Robert Lucas, an economic Nobel Prize Winner highly 
esteemed in his profession, declared1 that the “central 
problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all 
practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many 
decades” (Lucas 2003). Other, more sceptical econo-
mists who dared to make their colleagues aware of 
the large risks hidden in the US financial sector (like 
Raghuram Rajan did with a now-famous presentation 
1 Cited in: Paul Krugman (2009): Fighting Off Depression. See 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/05/opinion/05krugman.
html
in August 2005), received a stern rebuke: “I felt like an 
early Christian who had wandered into a convention of 
half-starved lions” (Rajan 2010, 3).
In the last two years, not only has economists’ 
overconfidence in their own expertise (Angner 2006) 
suffered a setback. More importantly, middle classes’ 
sense of basic system stability, security, legitimacy 
and trust (worthiness), which is so central for human 
well-being, has been shaken to its core. In the econ-
omy, almost nothing seems to be certain anymore. 
As a result of the financial crisis, people have begun 
to call into question the security of their saving ac-
counts. They have begun to wonder about bankers’ 
blatant economic irresponsibility and cynicism. They 
have begun to doubt the reliability and integrity of 
the regulators of the banking institutions. They have 
begun to distrust the future purchasing power of the 
euro. They have begun to fear that governments will 
default on their debt. They have begun to question 
whether bankers are held to be more equal than ordi-
nary citizens (to express it in Orwellian terms). In gen-
eral, people have begun to doubt the basic willingness 
of their economic and political elites to manage the 
economy in the interest of the general public instead 
of in the interest of their own pockets and their elit-
ist, possibly self-centered worldviews. According to 
Leo Müller (2010), who documents the massive failure 
of bank regulation in Germany, and Simon Johnson 
(2009), who writes about how the US is “becoming a 
banana republic”, they have at least some reason do so.
So, the financial crisis is not a purely economic crisis. 
It is a crisis of political and social trust, which is espe-
cially dangerous because social distrust can become a 
self-reinforcing spiral which may infect whole societies 
and cripple cooperation and development (Rothstein 
2005). Elites have a role model function which is im-
portant for the integration of society2. Why should 
ordinary citizens stick to the rules if members of the 
economic elites do not respect these rules and often 
escape largely unscathed in the end? Why should citi-
zens contribute to the greater good (e.g. paying taxes) 
2 One example for the importance of this role-model function, 
i.e. the influence of elites’ behavior (in this case: managers’ re-
muneration) on the behavior of ordinary citizens (in this case: 
willingness to support economic reforms and working effort) 
was empirically proved by Hesse (2008).
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if much of it is used to fill the money sinks in all these 
“bad banks” now popping up everywhere (Müller 2010), 
while those who are responsible for the mess often 
lead a fine life? Why should citizens trust the politi-
cal elite who (as would-be supervisors) stood on the 
sidelines when their Federal State banks (the German 
Landesbanken) squandered incredible amounts of 
money in reckless “investments”, which will put a very 
heavy burden on many states’ budgets in the coming 
decade (Müller 2010)? Why should citizens tolerate the 
prospective tax increases and/or benefit cuts to com-
pensate for this? What to think of a political elite who 
lets citizens instead of banks’ shareholders and unse-
cured bank creditors bear the brunt of banks’ toxic 
waste (which would have been possible via the “good 
bank/bad bank-model”, see e.g. Buiter 2009a, b, c, d), 
but only a few months later calls for “taboo-free” dis-
cussions about spending cuts in educational and social 
policy? What is the real “taboo”?
“Bailing out the holders of existing bank debt and other 
bank creditors would be outrageously unfair: they did 
the lending and made the investments, they should eat 
the losses. In addition, many of the creditors are likely to 
be much better off, even after they write down/off their 
claims on the banks, than most of the tax payers and 
public expenditure beneficiaries that pay for the bail out. 
Bailing out the existing creditors would also create dread-
ful incentives for excessive future risk-taking by banks” 
(Buiter 2009b).
So, how should social science education deal with 
the sweeping economic developments, the outra-
geous unfairness (Buiter) and the ensuing legitimacy 
crisis in the last years? What didactic consequences 
should be drawn from the failure of financial markets, 
the failure of the majority of the economics profes-
sion, the failure of regulatory policy and politics and 
the failure of the political class in the last decade?
What should pupils learn about the current finan-
cial crisis and/or financial crises in general and why? 
How can they develop a deeper understanding of the 
issue which goes beyond superficial media stories on 
the topic?
Can financial education make a contribution to de-
crease the likelihood and/or severity of future finan-
cial crises and if so, how? Or is that an illusion?
Do we need a stronger insistence on the moral di-
mension of economic education in order to combat a 
culture of excessive “greed” in finance (and beyond) 
which is often made responsible for the crisis in public 
debates at the moment? If so, how should such a con-
ception of ethical economic learning look like?
What are the consequences of the financial crisis for 
current theoretical conceptions of civic and/or eco-
nomic education? Do these have to be partially revised 
or are they already well suited to analyse the topic?
How do pupils view the financial crisis and its 
causes and how do these cognitive conceptions relate 
to scientific conceptions? What are possible “miscon-
ceptions” and how should civic / economic education 
deal with these?
The articles in the current issue continue the dis-
cussion of these questions which we already started 
in the last issue. Firstly, Mikl-Horke analyses financial 
markets from a sociological viewpoint and shows the 
importance of re-embedding these markets in social 
knowledge.  Ötsch and Kappeler make clear why or-
thodox (neoclassical) economic education as currently 
taught in many universities is not well suited to pro-
mote an adequate understanding of the financial 
crisis. Koutselini approaches the financial crisis from 
a philosophical and ethical viewpoint. Afterwards, 
Reifner and Schelhowe deal with the topic of finan-
cial education. Subsequently, Schuhen investigates 
how students think about the financial crisis and its 
causes. Last but not least and beyond the main topic 
of this edition, but not unrelated to it, the article of 
Elisabeth Chatel analyses how economic education is 
taught in France, which is quite different from the or-
thodox (neoclassic) approach and therefore may be an 
interesting alternative to the one criticized by Ötsch 
and Kappeler in this issue.
Gertraude Mikl-Horke argues that trust, confidence 
and norms based on long-term relations between ac-
tors are essential preconditions for the efficient func-
tioning of financial markets. For her, the main origin 
of the financial crisis lies in a process of growing dis-
embeddedness, i.e. of increasing dissociation of the 
financial sector from the real economy and the wider 
society since the 1980s. She analyses and criticizes the 
idea of “financial literacy” for its individualistic bias 
and for diverting attention away from socio-political 
dimension and basis of financial markets, i.e. from the 
question of the rationality and legitimacy of their cur-
rent shape. As an alternative, which may counteract 
the current dis-embeddedness of the financial sector, 
she advances the idea of a “social literacy”, which puts 
financial decision making in relation to values, norms 
and overall aims of the society and encompasses a 
consideration for the larger effects of financial mar-
kets on society and culture.
Walter Ötsch and Jakob Kappeler develop the thesis 
that today’s economic education is anything but help-
ful in supporting students to understand the economy 
in general and the financial crisis in particular. They 
see the reason for this failure of economic education 
in its narrow focus on just one theoretical paradigm, 
i.e. neoclassical economics. This theoretical approach 
is said to be completely inadequate to explain the cri-
sis, because of its underlying cognitive theory (naïve 
representationalism) and its overemphasis on the self-
regulating capacities of the market. Both of these core 
assumptions of neoclassical economics were invalidat-
ed (once again) by the financial crisis. But despite the 
shipwreck of neoclassical theory, Ötsch and Kappeler 
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show, academic economists and their textbooks still 
cling to this theoretical approach. In contrast, the 
authors recommend a different approach to teaching 
economics, which is based on theoretical pluralism 
and problem-centered learning.
According to Mary Koutselini, the financial crisis can-
not be reduced to economic causes, but has deeper, 
i.e. philosophical, educational, and ethical roots. Thus, 
the crisis has to be understood as a citizenship crisis, 
as a collapse of the moral and ethical ties of society. 
She argues that the recurrent crises of financial capi-
talism have their reason in an imbalance between the 
three Aristotelian concepts of “the Necessary, the Use-
ful, and the Good” in the current society, where the 
Useful dominates the other two principles and where 
especially “the Good” (morality, justice etc.) is mar-
ginalized. This is reflected in contemporary education, 
which increasingly focuses on training workers and 
consumers self-absorbed in enhancing their individu-
al competitiveness and living standards, whereas the 
development of a holistic person who is also actively 
aware of the greater good (nature, society, etc.) and 
who feels a sense of responsibility for its concerns is 
neglected. As an antidote, she advocates the modern-
meta modern discourse as a new paradigm of commu-
nication, schooling and coexistence in society.
The article of Udo Reifner and Anne Schelhowe ad-
dresses the issue of financial education. This is an 
important aspect of the financial crisis because of at 
least two reasons. Firstly, a pivotal cause of the crisis 
was that imperfect rationality led many people espe-
cially in the US and the UK to take out loans of all 
kinds which they could not repay later (Bar-Gill 2009). 
Secondly, an unfortunate consequence of the crisis 
was that banks persuaded unexperienced, confiding 
customers to invest (and hold) their money in rather 
risky Lehman bonds, which became worthless in the 
wake of the bankruptcy. As a consequence, the au-
thors argue that the task of financial education should 
be to enhance the ability of citizens to make compe-
tent choices and to promote self-confident consumer 
behavior in the financial market. They present the va-
riety of approaches and projects in Germany which 
are concerned with this issue. Finally, they depict their 
own two projects of financial education in schools, 
which put special emphasis on learner-oriented case 
studies and on systematic cooperation with banks.
Michael Schuhen conducted a qualitative empirical 
investigation concerning the subjective knowledge of 
undergraduate university students about the global 
financial and economic depression. How do these sub-
jective theories relate to explanations of the crisis pur-
ported by the media and the social sciences? In order 
to find out, the author let them write an essay about 
the causes and impacts of the financial crisis and 
asked them to give recommendations for possible po-
litical countermeasures. For Schuhen, the results of his 
empirical study are “partially disillusioning”, because 
the students – even those who minor in economics – 
showed a huge lack of knowledge about the causes of 
the depression and most students did not make any 
reference to scientific argumentation patterns.
The article of Elisabeth Chatel considers the situation 
of economic education in France, particularly in the 
general streams of French upper secondary schools as 
part of the subject called Economic and Social Scienc-
es (ESS). By analyzing the evolution of the prescribed 
curriculum, the author shows that ESS constitutes a 
distinct approach which is radically different from 
the usual way of teaching economics in universities. 
Thus, it may seem to be no wonder that is was chal-
lenged on several occasions by academic economists 
and business representatives who claimed that busi-
ness and enterprise were shown in an unfavorable 
light. However, until today the teachers of the subject 
were able to defend the multidisciplinary and plural-
istic character of their subject while at the same time 
strengthening its scientific, analytical basis.
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